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Successful collective action often depends
on the presence of leaders, who bear
greater responsibility than other group
members for the logistics of coordina-
tion, monitoring of effort, and reward
and punishment. Leaders may be expected
to shoulder more risk, are vulnerable to
retaliation from sanctioned group mem-
bers, and suffer greater reputational dam-
age from failed collective action. What
then motivates individuals to be lead-
ers? From an evolutionary perspective, the
answer is not straightforward since most
of human history occurred in societies
lacking significant disparities in material
wealth and institutions that grant lead-
ers coercive power. One possibility is that
group members share costs by distributing
leadership roles over iterations of collec-
tive action. However, this is uncommon
where inter-individual differences in lead-
ership ability have an impact on collective
action. Whether in small-scale egalitarian
societies or large-scale stratified societies,
group members typically prefer leaders
who are superlative in traits such as phys-
ical size, knowledge, and prosociality (von
Rueden et al., in press).
Price and van Vugt (2014) offer another
theoretical solution: followers reciprocate
leaders’ services by granting them pres-
tige. As a result of their prestige, leaders
receive gifts, coalitional support, deference
from competitors, or mating opportunity.
I have a minor definitional criticism. I do
not see prestige as what is conditionally
granted to leaders but rather what leaders
can automatically produce through their
actions: a reputation for delivering benefits
to others. What Price and van Vugt (2014)
note is that the advantages to prestige may
accrue principally during times of need,
such as during conflict or food shortage,
and thus leadership can act as a form of
insurance (Boone and Kessler, 1999).
Since the benefits leaders provide are
often public goods, the service-for-prestige
theory entails that group members can
free-ride by (1) not contributing to collec-
tive action, (2) not rewarding leaders, and
(3) not punishing group members who
fail to reward leaders. This is where the
service-for-prestige theory makes unique
predictions relative to other theories of
leadership: followers will experience puni-
tive sentiment toward other group mem-
bers who fail to reward effective leaders
(or followers will experience prosocial sen-
timent toward group members who crit-
icize ineffective leaders). Price and van
Vugt (2014) present an example from
the Ecuadorian Amazon (Price, 2003)
where group members who lack respect
for popular leaders are themselves disre-
spected. Future work will need to deter-
mine whether such punitive sentiment is
sufficient to stabilize group member con-
tributions to leaders, in various cultural
and organizational contexts.
Theoretical alternatives to service-for-
prestige predict that followers do not
experience a collective action problem in
bestowing benefits on leaders, because
leadership produces private goods not
subject to free-riding (costly signaling
theory), followers’ contributions to lead-
ers are a product of group selection,
or leaders recoup their costs by receiv-
ing greater direct benefits from collective
action. Examples of the latter include col-
lective actions that produce goods more
beneficial to leaders and their kin (Ruttan
and Borgerhoff Mulder, 1999) and lead-
ers who claim a greater share of the
spoils (Hooper et al., 2010; Gavrilets and
Fortunato, 2014).
As Price and van Vugt (2014) suggest,
social neuroscience methods (e.g., iden-
tifying the neural correlates of punitive
sentiment in public goods games) can
help test the explanatory power of the
service-for-prestige model against alter-
native models of leadership. The public
goods game has been modified to intro-
duce asymmetries into decision-making
over the distribution of public good shares
(van der Heijden et al., 2009) or over pun-
ishment and reward (O’Gorman et al.,
2009). However, caution is required when
making inferences from particular exper-
imental games, whose conditions (e.g.,
player endowments as windfalls) may
rarely hold in natural settings or may be
interpreted in different ways depending
on the cultural context. In highland New
Guinea where leaders demonstrated their
qualifications via competitive generos-
ity, large offers in the ultimatum game
were perceived not as prosocial but as
antagonistic (Tracer, 2003).
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